I’ve Seen This Before: Sharing Cyber-Physical Incident Knowledge by Alrimawi, Faeq et al.
I’ve Seen This Before: Sharing Cyber-Physical Incident Knowledge 
Faeq Alrimawi 
Lero-The Irish Software 
Research Centre 
Limerick, Ireland 
faeq.alrimawi@lero.ie 
Liliana Pasquale 
University College Dublin & 
Lero 
Dublin, Ireland 
liliana.pasquale@ucd.ie 
Deepak Mehta 
United Technologies Research 
Centre-UTRC 
Cork, Ireland 
mehtad@utrc.utc.com 
Bashar Nuseibeh 
The Open University & 
Lero 
UK/Ireland 
bashar.nuseibeh@lero.ie 
ABSTRACT 
An increasing number of security incidents in cyber-physical 
systems (CPSs) arise from the exploitation of cyber and physical 
components of such systems. Knowledge about how such 
incidents arose is rarely captured and used systematically to 
enhance security and support future incident investigations. In this 
paper, we propose an approach to represent and share incidents 
knowledge. Our approach captures incident patterns – common 
aspects of incidents occurring in different CPSs. Our approach 
then allows incident patterns to be instantiated for different 
systems to assess if and how such patterns can manifest again. To 
support our approach, we provide two meta-models that represent, 
respectively, incident patterns and the cyber-physical systems 
themselves. The incident meta-model captures the characteristics 
of incidents, such as assets and activities. The system meta-model 
captures cyber and physical components and their interactions, 
which may be exploited during an incident. We demonstrate the 
feasibility of our approach in the application domain of smart 
buildings, by tailoring the system meta-model to represent 
components and interactions in this domain. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Software and its engineering → Model-driven software 
engineering 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) combines computation, 
communication, and physical processes to produce systems that 
are more adaptive, collaborative, and autonomous [1]. 
Applications of CPS [2] can be found in various domains 
including industrial control, transportation, and smart buildings. 
This combination of processes enables interactions between cyber 
and physical components, in which an event caused by a cyber 
component can have an impact on physical ones, and vice-versa. 
For example, in a smart building, a rise in the measured 
temperature of a room can trigger a digital process to issue a 
command to an air conditioner to start cooling the room. 
Interactions between cyber and physical components are 
giving more opportunities to malicious individuals to cause harm 
[3]. For example, in the Ukrainian power grid incident [4], 
offenders used spear phishing to gain a foothold in the distribution 
companies computer networks. Then, they gained access to the 
power grid network, where they infected some devices (e.g., 
workstations, serial-to-Ethernet) that control electricity 
distribution with malware. Subsequently, they disabled infected 
devices. This caused a disruption of the normal operation of the 
grid. Previously, in the German steel-mill incident [5], offenders 
used spear phishing to gain a foothold in the corporate network. 
Then, they gained access to the plant’s network, where they 
infected programmable logic controllers with malware. 
Subsequently, they caused damage to various components such as 
the blast furnace and the alarm system. Consequently, the normal 
operation of the plant was interrupted. 
Incidents often have similar characteristics. For example, in 
the Ukrainian power grid and the German steel-mill incidents, an 
offender infiltrated into a private network using spear phishing. 
Although commonalities between these incidents can be observed, 
these have not been captured and used systematically to enhance 
security and support incident investigations [6]. Current attack 
modeling techniques (e.g., attack graphs [7]) focus on 
representing how a traditional cyber attack (e.g., denial of service) 
can occur. As these techniques do not account for the interactions 
between cyber and physical components, they are not suitable to 
represent cyber-physical incidents [8]. Moreover, they focus on 
representing the actions of an attack, while underrepresenting 
other characteristics such as resources and intent, which can be 
useful in a digital forensic investigation. Other work [9] focuses 
on modeling specific attacks (e.g., switching attacks) that can 
occur in certain application domains, such as smart grids. Thus, 
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this modeling technique cannot be applied to represent different 
types of attacks that can also happen in other application domains. 
Moreover, resources for capturing and sharing incidents 
commonalities, such as the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration 
and Classification (CAPEC) catalog [10], only focus on cyber 
attacks. Incident knowledge is represented using natural language, 
making it difficult to use the CAPEC catalog in an automated 
fashion. 
In this paper, we propose an approach to represent and share 
incident knowledge. Our approach captures incident patterns – 
common aspects of incidents occurring in different CPSs. Our 
approach then allows incident patterns to be instantiated for 
different systems to assess if and how such patterns can manifest 
again. To support our technique, we provide two meta-models to 
represent, respectively, incident patterns and cyber-physical 
systems themselves. The incident pattern meta-model captures 
CPS incidents characteristics, such as activities, assets, actors, 
resources, goals, and motives. The system meta-model captures 
cyber and physical components and their interactions, which may 
be exploited during an incident. We demonstrate the feasibility of 
our approach using smart buildings as an application domain, by 
tailoring the system meta-model to represent components and 
interactions in this domain. Our ultimate objective is to use 
knowledge of previous incidents to enhance security, for example, 
by enabling security measures to prevent incidents conforming to 
some of the discovered patterns. Incident knowledge can also be 
leveraged to improve forensic readiness in CPSs [11]. For 
example, it is possible to identify data proactively that may be 
relevant to an incident (i.e. potential evidence) in order to support 
future digital investigations. Identifying potential evidence is 
considered a challenge and the first step towards forensic 
readiness [12]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2 we discuss a motivating example for sharing incidents 
knowledge among different smart buildings. In Section 3 we 
describe our approach. In Sections 4 and 5 we illustrate, 
respectively, the cyber-physical system meta-model and the 
incident pattern meta-model. In Section 6 we apply our approach 
to our example. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude and discuss 
future work.  
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
We present an example to motivate why representing and sharing 
knowledge about incidents in cyber-physical systems is important. 
As depicted in Fig. 1, our scenario is centered on the ACME 
Company that operates across three different smart buildings: a 
Research Center, a Warehouse, and a Manufacturing Plant. The 
plan of the 2nd floor of the Research Center consists of a Server 
Room, a Control Room, and a Toilet. The Server Room has a Fire 
Alarm, an air conditioning unit (HVAC), and some Servers. The 
Control Room has a Workstation. The whole building is equipped 
with smart lights. The listed devices, including the smart lights, 
are connected to the Internal IP network. 
One day the security administrators of the ACME Company 
discovered that an incident occurred in the Research Center. An 
offender reached the 2nd floor, entered the Toilet, and connected to 
the smart light (SL) using a laptop. After that, s/he obtained access 
to the internal IP Network and was able to eavesdrop data 
transmitted over the network (e.g., data exchanged between the 
Workstation and the Servers). The incident actions are listed at the 
bottom of Fig. 1. 
Upon the discovery of the incident, security administrators 
wrote a report describing how the incident occurred. They needed 
to assess whether similar incidents can take place also in the other 
smart buildings and in what ways. This would allow security 
administrators to enhance security in the smart buildings because 
they can enact security measures able to prevent similar incidents 
from happening. Moreover, this would allow identifying data 
indicating that similar incidents are occurring in the smart 
buildings. Monitoring this data proactively can support 
investigating these incidents, shall they occur. 
To assess whether similar incidents characteristics can 
manifest also in the other buildings, security administrators have 
to examine the physical structure of each building, as well as the 
software and network configurations of the digital devices within 
the buildings in order to identify existing vulnerabilities brought 
by cyber and physical components. After that, security 
administrators can analyze what activities of an incident can 
reoccur because they can exploit discovered vulnerabilities. This 
methodology brings the following challenges: 
• How should information about an incident be represented? 
Incident reports are usually written in natural language and 
may not be structured. Therefore, it can be arduous to 
analyze these documents manually. This can increase the 
effort required to assess whether certain incident 
characteristics can manifest again in other systems. 
Moreover, incident reports can contain information that is 
Figure 1 Motivating scenario for sharing incidents knowledge. 
 3 
too specific (e.g., access to the 2nd floor of the Research 
Center or to the Toilet) making it difficult to generalize 
incident knowledge to other domains. Incident reports also 
may contain sensitive information about the company (e.g., 
the internal network structure of the Research Center) 
hindering the possibility to share incident information with 
other companies. 
• What information should be shared about an incident? 
Incident reports often focus on representing malicious 
actions. However, to perpetrate an incident an offender can 
perform both legitimate and malicious actions. Thus, 
representing only malicious actions might lead to 
overlooking some legitimate actions that are relevant (e.g., 
physical accessibility to smart lights in the Toilet). 
Consequently, data related to these actions might not be 
collected and stored proactively, hence, any future 
investigations of similar incidents might be more difficult 
because some relevant evidence is missing. Moreover, 
identifying vulnerabilities in a system can be difficult, since a 
system as a smart building can contain several hundreds of 
components with various vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
[13]. Some vulnerabilities can be thus overlooked due to 
human errors. 
• Are available resources sufficient? Current resources such as 
the Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) dictionary 
[14] focus on cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which are used to 
assess cybersecurity of a system. However, for incidents in 
cyber-physical systems, this is not sufficient due to the 
interactions between cyber and physical components that are 
often exploited (e.g., physical reachability to smart light to 
connect to the digital network) [15]. Moreover, to support 
digital investigations, it is also necessary to represent other 
incident characteristics, such as actors, resources adopted and 
assets targeted by an action. These characteristics have been 
neglected in existing incident representations. 
To address the aforementioned challenges, we introduce our 
approach in the next section. 
3 REPRESENTING & SHARING INCIDENTS 
KNOWLEDGE 
Our approach aims to share incident knowledge across different 
cyber-physical systems. Incident knowledge is represented as 
incident patterns indicating common characteristics, such as 
activities, assets, resources, locations, and motives, among 
incidents that occurred in different systems. As shown in Fig. 2, 
our approach includes two main activities: 1) Incident Pattern 
Extraction and 2) Incident Pattern Instantiation. During incident 
patterns extraction, patterns are identified from incidents that 
occurred and are then stored in an Incident Pattern Repository 
shared across different systems. In our incident example, the 
actions “enter Toilet” and “connect to Internal IP Network using 
SL” can be expressed in a more abstract form into an incident 
pattern such as “enter Location” and “connect to IP network” 
activities. A Visitor who is inside the Location can perform both 
activities and can exploit a co-located SmartDevice to connect to 
the IP network. The extracted pattern can then be added to the 
repository. During incident patterns instantiation, patterns are 
mapped to different systems to identify potential incident 
instances i.e. to identify whether and how such patterns can 
manifest again. For example, the extracted pattern, shown in Fig. 
2, can be instantiated to the Warehouse, the Research Center and 
the Manufacturing Plant. In the Warehouse, the pattern activities 
can be mapped, for example, to the actions “enter Office1” and 
“connect to IP network using Fire Alarm”. In the Manufacturing 
Plant, the pattern activities can be mapped to the actions “enter 
Office2” and “connect to Internal IP Network using Workstation”. 
The Incident Pattern Extraction activity is carried out as 
illustrated in Fig. 3. First, a security administrator models the 
incident that occurred. Incident modeling requires, as input, a 
system representation that specifies the system components and 
their potential interactions. In addition, incident modeling is 
assisted by an incident pattern meta-model and a system meta-
model, which act as templates. The two meta-models are 
discussed later in the paper. Subsequently, the Pattern Extraction 
activity extracts a pattern from the incident model. This activity is 
assisted by the incident pattern meta-model and the system meta-
model, which can be used to identify possible levels of 
abstractions that could be used to make the actions and the 
Figure 2 Application of our approach on the example. 
Figure 3 Incident Pattern Extraction (1) and Instantiation (2). 
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incident characteristics more general and re-usable across 
different systems. Several incident patterns with different levels of 
abstraction may be extracted, which can then be reviewed by a 
security administrator. Afterwards, the extracted pattern is sent to 
the repository and could be merged with other existing patterns, if 
necessary. 
Furthermore, Fig. 3 shows the Incident Pattern Instantiation 
activity, which is executed as follows. During Pattern Mapping, 
an incident pattern is fetched from the repository and then mapped 
against a system representation to identify potential incident 
instances. Subsequently, during Security & Forensic Readiness 
Analysis, incident instances are analyzed to determine which 
security and forensic readiness measures should be applied to, 
respectively, prevent and investigate generated incident instances. 
Security measures can prevent some actions in the generated 
incident instances from occurring, while forensic readiness 
measures can identify incident-relevant data that should be 
collected proactively because they may constitute an evidence 
during future digital investigations. 
4 REPRESENTING CYBER-PHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS 
We describe a meta-model to represent cyber and physical 
components and their interactions. We tailor our system meta-
model to represent smart buildings as an application area of CPS 
since we have a research interest in it.  
A simplified version of the smart building meta-model is 
shown in Fig. 4. The meta-model includes the following entities. 
An Asset is an abstract entity that represents a component in a 
smart building such as a server. Each Asset instance is identified 
by its name. An Asset can be physical or digital. PhysicalAssets 
represent any physical component in a smart building, such as 
Actor, PhysicalStructure, and ComputingDevice. Actor can be a 
person in the smart building such as a Visitor or an Employee. For 
example, in the research center incident example, the offender is 
represented as a Visitor. PhysicalStructure represents part of the 
smart building physical layout, which includes Room and Floor. 
For example, the Toilet in the research center can be defined as a 
Room. ComputingDevice represents any computing device such as 
FireAlarm, SmartLight, Server, HVAC, and Workstation. 
DigitalAssets can be any data or software that is created, stored, 
manipulated, run, or communicated in digital form such as File 
and Processes. Process has an attribute status that defines its 
current state (e.g., RUNNING or STOPPED). 
Moreover, the meta-model allows representing containment 
and connectivity relations between system components. 
Containment is represented through relations containedAssets and 
cotnainedDigitalAssets. The containedAssets relation denotes the 
Asset(s) contained by a TanigbleAsset. For example, the Server 
Room in the research center can be defined as a Room containing 
SmartLight, FireAlarm, HVAC, and Server. The 
containedDigitalAssets relation denotes the DigitalAsset(s) 
contained by a DigitalAsset. For example, a SmartLight can 
contain a Process managing communication with other 
ComputingDevices. A Connection has attributes asset1 and 
asset2, which represent both ends of a connection, and a type 
specifying the connection type such as “wired”. Connection is 
extended to DigitalConnection, which represents connections 
between DigitalAssets and/or PhysicalAssets, and 
PhysicalConnection, which represents connections between 
PhysicalAssets. For example, a DigitalConnection can be defined 
between the SmartLight in the Toilet and the Servers in the 
ServerRoom, which has type IP_network. A PhysicalConnection 
between two ComputingDevices (e.g., Fire Alarm and HVAC) can 
be defined with the type wired. The meta-model also includes the 
entity Action, which specifies the dynamics of a system. For 
example, the Research Center can include actions such as “enter a 
Room” and “connect to a ComputingDevice”. An Action may 
have a precondition and postcondition that describe, respectively, 
the required system state before the action is performed and the 
system state after the action is performed. For example, the 
precondition of action “enter a Room” is that the Actor 
performing the action is inside a Room that is physically 
connected to the Room to be accessed, for example, through a 
door. Although not addressed here, contextual constraints over 
entities’ properties and actions could also be represented as state 
properties of an entity, such as Context. For example, a contextual 
constraint named WorkingHours can be attached to action “enter a 
Room”, which indicates that accessing a room is permitted only 
during working hours. The postcondition of action “enter a 
Room” is that the accessed Room contains the Actor who 
performed the action. 
The meta-model was implemented as an Eclipse plugin that is 
publicly available1. 
                                                                
1https://tinyurl.com/yb2kkuvl 
Figure 4 Smart building meta-model (simplified). 
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5 REPRESENTING INCIDENT PATTERNS 
We represent incident patterns using a meta-model that is based 
on the concept of crime script [16]. A crime script is used in 
criminology to describe the sequence of activities of a physical 
incident in order to improve the understanding of the incident-
commission process and the identification of incident prevention 
techniques [17]. However, there is a lack of a unified model to 
represent the entities and relationships found in a crime script. 
Moreover, crime scripts focus on physical incidents only, while 
neglecting cyber incidents and cyber-physical incidents.  
Our meta-model captures the primary and secondary entities 
found in crime scripts. Primary entities are those represented in all 
crime script models published in the literature, while secondary 
entities are those mentioned, implicitly or explicitly, in most of 
the models published in the literature [17][18]. The meta-model 
also includes additional entities such as DigitalAsset to represent 
cyber components. A simplified version of the meta-model is 
shown in Fig. 5. The meta-model was implemented as an Eclipse 
plugin that is publicly available2. 
Fig. 5 shows the incident pattern meta-model. A primary entity 
is the crime script itself; it is characterized by a name and a 
description. CrimeScript entity includes a set of Scenes, which are 
the phases in which certain activities take place (e.g., preparation 
scene). Each scene, in turn, includes a set of activities that an 
entity performs during the incident. An Activity is characterized 
by a name, a precondition that represents the system state required 
to perform the activity, and a postcondition that represents the 
system state after executing the activity. An Activity also defines, 
as relations, its nextActivities, and previousActivities. An Activity 
                                                                
2https://tinyurl.com/y796ouyq 
corresponds to an Action entity in the system meta-model. The 
pre-/post-conditions of an Activity can be abstracted from the pre-
/post-conditions of Action(s) defined in a system representation. 
For example, the Action “enter Toilet” can be abstracted to the 
Activity “enter Room”. Secondary entities are used to relate an 
activity to the entity performing it (e.g., victim or offender). 
Additional entities, such as Asset, Resource, and Location can 
better characterize an activity. 
In the incident pattern meta-model, an Asset is an entity that 
can be harmed during an incident. The status of an Asset can be 
defined as an attribute. For example, a Workstation defined as an 
Asset can have on/off as status. An Asset can be further extended 
by the entities DigitalAsset and PhysicalAsset. An Asset can have 
a direct mapping to the Asset entity presented in the system meta-
model. As shown in the previous section, Assets can be further 
extended in the system meta-model to represent more concrete 
entities such as Room and ComputingDevice.  
An Actor represents a group or an individual who performs an 
activity and can be an Offender or a Victim. A Resource represents 
a tool needed to perform an activity. PhysicalResource refers to a 
physical tool used by an offender in an incident (e.g., laptop). 
DigitalResource represents a software tool that an offender can 
use to perform certain activities in an incident (e.g., malware). An 
Actor and a Resource could be extended by entities Actor and 
Asset represented in the system meta-model. A Location 
represents a place where an activity or a sequence of activities of a 
scene is performed. Location in the meta-model is an interface 
that is implemented by Asset, Resource, and Actor. A location can 
be physical or digital. A PhysicalLocation represents a place in 
the physical space (e.g., a room) where an activity or a sequence 
of activities takes place. A digital location represents a place in 
the cyberspace such as an IP address or a digital folder. For each 
Location, contained locations can be defined via the relation 
cotnainedLocations, and also its parent location via the relation 
parentLocation.  
Connections can be defined between a Location and other 
entities (e.g., digital connection between two Workstations). A 
Connection has a direct mapping to a more concrete Connection 
entity that is defined in the system meta-model. For example, a 
DigitalConnection in an incident pattern can be an abstraction of a 
more concrete Connection (e.g., WiFiConnection) defined in a 
system representation. The ActivityInitiator is an interface that 
defines the entity that performs an activity. ActivityInitiator is 
implemented by entities Actor, Asset, and Resource. This implies 
that our meta-model allows, not only an Actor to perform 
activities, but also Asset and Resource. For example, an activity 
may be performed by a malware, which can be considered as a 
Resource. 
The incident pattern meta-model has the potential to provide a 
systematic and rich representation of incidents since it 
encompasses not only the activities of an incident but also related 
entities and relationships (e.g., location, assets, and actors). 
Moreover, the possibility to extend the meta-model entities with 
domain-specific entities identified from a system representation 
makes our meta-model extensible and general enough to be 
applied to different types of systems. 
Figure 5 Incident pattern meta-model (simplified). 
6 
 
Fig. 6 shows the incident pattern extracted from the incident 
example described in Section 2. Action “enter Toilet” can be 
abstracted to the activity “enter Target_Location” and is 
performed by a Visitor. A precondition for this activity is that the 
Target Location should be a Room that contains a SmartDevice 
connected to a DigitalAsset of type IP_Network. A postcondition 
for the activity is that Target Location contains Visitor. 
Actions “connect physically to SL” and “connect digitally to 
internal IP network”, can be abstracted to activity the “connect to 
IP_Network”. This activity is associated with entities Room, 
IP_Network, and Laptop. A precondition for this activity is that 
the Visitor contains Laptop i.e. the visitor carries a laptop. This 
activity requires activity “enter Target_Location” to have 
occurred, and results in the creation of a new connection between 
the Laptop and the IP_Network. 
To further illustrate the mapping from an incident to a pattern, 
we suggest the following guidelines. The first aspect to determine 
is what sequence of actions can be mapped to a single activity. 
This depends on how closely related are these actions, for 
example, whether they share many of their entities and relations. 
Second aspect to consider is identifying entities in an incident 
that need to be extracted. Each entity associated with an action 
can be used, targeted, exploited, initiator, or can denote a location. 
Determining the role of an entity in an action can determine the 
entity type to use from the incident pattern meta-model. For 
example, the action “enter Toilet” has the entities Visitor, which 
represents the ActivityInitiator as an Actor, and Toilet which 
represents a PhysicalAsset that is a targeted Location. The 
relationship between the Visitor and the Toilet is that the Toilet 
should contain the Visitor after executing the action.  
Third aspect is to determine what level of abstraction and 
properties is appropriate for the pattern. This will heavily depend 
on the level of details needed. In our approach, we use a system 
meta-model to determine possible abstraction levels. For example, 
in the system meta-model, a SmartLight can be abstracted to 
ComputingDevice, PhysicalAsset, and Asset, ranging from the 
least abstract to the most abstract entity. When a more abstract 
entity is adopted (e.g., PhysicalAsset) the incident pattern can be 
applied to a wider set of systems compared to when a more 
specific entity is considered such as SmartLight. The choice of a 
suitable level of abstraction requires the intervention of a security 
administrator. For example, if the objective is to investigate ways 
in which a computing device (smart light or other) can be 
exploited to connect to a network, then using SmartLight will not 
be sufficient, so ComputingDevice would be a more suitable 
abstraction. 
Finally, a sequence of actions of an incident may be abstracted 
by reusing existing activities of incident patterns that have already 
been stored in the repository. For example, if an offender 
exploited the fire alarm in an office to gain access to an internal IP 
network, an incident pattern could be created using activities 
“enter Location” then “connect to IP network using DigitalAsset”. 
These activities can be mapped to the actions of the incident that 
occurred in the research center. 
6 USING INCIDENT PATTERNS 
In this section, we demonstrate how our approach uses incident 
patterns to assess how such patterns can manifest in the other 
smart buildings i.e. the Warehouse and the Manufacturing Plant. 
As shown at the bottom of Fig. 7, the Warehouse has three 
rooms (Office1, Office2, and Toilet), and a Storage Area. Office1 
contains a Fire Alarm and a Smart Light (SL1). Office2 contains a 
Smart Light (SL2). The Toilet contains a Smart Light (SL3). Fire 
Alarm, SL1, and SL2 are connected to the Internal IP Network. 
Based on this building configuration, the incident pattern can be 
mapped to 3 potential incident instances as shown in Fig. 7. 
Activity “enter Target_Location” can be mapped to actions “enter 
Office1” or “enter Office2”. This is because both offices contain 
smart devices (e.g., Fire Alarm, SL2) that are in turn connected to 
the Internal IP Network. This satisfies the precondition of activity 
“enter Target_Location” requiring that the entered room contains 
a SmartDevice connected to DigitalAsset of type IP_Network. 
“enter Toilet” is not a possible action since SL3 in the Toilet is not 
connected to the Internal IP Network, hence, it does not satisfy 
the activity precondition. The next activity “connect to 
IP_Network” can be mapped to six different actions that depend 
Figure 6 Incident pattern extraction. 
Figure 7 Map of incident pattern to the Warehouse. 
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on which smart device is exploited i.e. SL1, SL2, or Fire Alarm. 
For example, if the Visitor is in Office1, then the activity may be 
mapped to the two actions “connect physically to SL1” and 
“connect to Internal IP Network”. Similar actions can be 
identified for the Fire Alarm and SL2. The final activity “collect 
data” can be mapped to one action “eavesdrop” in this case, 
however, more actions can be chained to satisfy the activity if 
more details are provided, such as what type of data can be 
eavesdropped from the IP network.  
A similar approach can be adopted to map the incident pattern 
to the representation of the Manufacturing Plant shown at the 
bottom of Fig. 8. The Manufacturing Plant contains two rooms 
(Office1 and Materials Room) and a Product Line. Office1 
contains a Workstation that is connected to the Internal IP 
Network. Materials Room contains a Smart Light, Fire Alarm, and 
HVAC all connected to a separate network that is the Bus 
Network. According to this configuration, one potential incident 
instance can be identified, as shown in Fig. 8. Activity “enter 
Target_Location” is mapped to action “enter Office1”, since it 
satisfies the precondition of the activity. The action “enter 
Materials Room” is not a possible action since none of the devices 
in the Materials Room are connected to the Internal IP Network. 
Assuming that the Visitor is in Office1, activity “connect to 
IP_Network” can be mapped to action “connect to Internal IP 
Network using Workstation”. Finally, the activity “collect data” 
can be mapped to the action “eavesdrop”. 
Different configurations of the cyber and physical components 
in smart buildings may lead to different manifestations of the 
same incident pattern, as shown earlier. These manifestations can 
be further reasoned about to identify adequate measures to 
improve security and forensic readiness of a system. For example, 
a security measure for the Warehouse is to ensure that smart 
devices are firmly installed to prevent physical manipulation. 
7 RELATED WORK 
The literature shows little work has been done to represent and 
share incidents knowledge in cyber-physical systems. Current 
Attack Modeling Techniques (e.g., attack graphs [7]) focus on 
representing how a traditional cyber-attack (e.g., denial of service 
attack) can occur. Resources available are also focusing on 
sharing information about cyber attacks. 
A close work representing CPS incidents is proposed by 
Hawrylak et al. [19]. In this work, the authors develop Hybrid 
Attack Graph (HAG) to model cyber-physical attacks. HAG is a 
formalism that produces a graph of all possible ways a set of 
exploit patterns can be applied to a system. However, the 
approach focuses on representing malicious actions that exploit 
vulnerabilities found in some devices and does not consider other 
non-malicious interactions between cyber and physical 
components that can lead to undesired state. Additionally, the 
work focuses on representing actions, while neglecting other 
incident characteristics (e.g., intent, resources) that can be useful 
during digital forensic investigations. Chen et al. [20] use Petri 
nets as a modeling formalism to represent cyber-physical attacks 
on a smart grid. The approach represents concurrent physical and 
digital events to represent coordinated attacks performed by 
multiple attackers working in parallel. For example, an offender 
hacks the access control system [digital event], while another 
enters a prohibited location [physical event]. However, this 
approach still focuses on events and does not explicitly model 
other aspects of an incident that can be relevant for an 
investigation such as actors, and assets.  
Yampolskiy et al. [8] propose a cyber-physical attack 
description language (CP-ADL) that is based on a six-dimensional 
taxonomy of attacks on CPS. In their work, an incident is 
represented as a causal chain, which contains a set of atomic 
attacks. An atomic attack consists of a set of actions (includes 
attack means, and preconditions), cause (includes attack element, 
and changes), and effect (includes influenced element and impact 
on it). However, their approach does not consider other aspects of 
incidents such as locations of elements. Clausing et al. [21] 
provide a general attack modeling approach for industrial 
facilities. Their approach is based on designing a shared 
architecture view for Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which 
consists of several elements: entity, interface, carrier, protocol, 
humans, and data. Their focus is on modeling the system 
components, then adding steps of an attack to it. However, the 
approach is specific to ICS. 
Resources for sharing CPS incidents knowledge are limited. 
Currently, available resources provide information about cyber 
attacks. For example, the Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures 
(CVE) [14] is a publically available dictionary of known 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in software and devices. Moreover, 
The US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [22] is a 
database, based on CVE, of cybersecurity vulnerabilities that 
includes various metrics such as severity, impact on environment, 
and interactions required from users. The Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [10] catalog provides a 
textual description of various attacks against “cyber-enabled 
capabilities”. Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) 
[23] is a private resource that provides reports about incidents that 
occurred in ICS. However, both CAPEC and RISI provide 
information expressed in natural language about incidents. 
Therefore, incident information cannot be processed 
automatically. 
Figure 8 Map of incident pattern to the Manufacturing Plant. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
We proposed an approach to share incidents knowledge using 
incident patterns. Incident patterns capture commons aspects of 
incidents occurring in different systems. To support our approach, 
we provided two meta-models that represent, respectively, 
incident patterns and the cyber-physical systems themselves. We 
described a meta-model to represent components and interactions 
in smart buildings. We also discussed the incident pattern meta-
model and gave an example of an incident pattern and some 
guidelines to create them. We demonstrated how our approach 
could be used to create an incident pattern, and map such pattern 
to different systems to identify how similar incidents may reoccur. 
In future work, we intend to evaluate expressivity of our 
incident pattern meta-model by using it to represent different 
incidents that can occur in CPS. We will try to model synthetic 
incidents extracted from the literature as well as real incidents. In 
addition, we intend to develop a technique to automate the process 
of extraction of incident patterns and instantiation of such patterns 
to cyber-physical systems. To instantiate incident patterns, we 
intend to use a modeling formalism to reason about system 
dynamics. Bigraphical Reactive Systems (BRS) [24] are a strong 
candidate to reason about system dynamics since they provide 
reaction rules to express system evolution. BRS use Bigraphs to 
represent the system state. Bigraphs allow representing the 
configuration of cyber and physical components as well as their 
interactions. This eliminates constraints (e.g., limited 
connectivity) imposed by other formalisms such as action calculi, 
which are suitable to represent interactions only between physical 
or cyber components. Moreover, BRS have been used to reason 
about CPS for various applications domains such as adaptive 
security systems [25]. Finally, we plan to develop a technique to 
analyze incidents that are generated from mapping a pattern to a 
system. Our analysis will aim at identifying potential evidence 
(e.g., assets, actions), which can be collected and stored 
proactively for the purpose of supporting future investigations. 
We will apply our techniques, once developed, to several 
scenarios to evaluate them against some metrics such as 
correctness, performance and scalability. 
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